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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the relationship between the characteristics of medical licensing 
boards and the frequency with which boards discipline physicians. Specifically, we take 
advantage of variation in the structure of medical licensing boards between 1993 and 2003 to 
determine the effect of organizational and budgetary independence, public oversight, and 
resource constraints on rates of physician discipline. We find that larger licensing boards, 
boards with more staff, and boards that are organizationally independent from state 
government discipline doctors more frequently. Public oversight and political control over 
board budgets do not appear to influence the extent to which medical licensing boards 
discipline doctors. These findings are broadly consistent with theories of regulatory behavior 
that emphasize the importance of bureaucratic autonomy for effective regulatory enforcement. 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
* We are grateful to the Federation of State Medical Boards for making available the data used for this study. 
Any views expressed are those of the authors’ exclusively. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
An understanding of the factors that influence the enforcement of laws and regulations is of clear importance for 
public policy. The effective design of new regulatory agencies and the fruitful reform of existing ones require an 
appreciation of the incentives and constraints that regulators face. While there is a small literature that 
investigates the determinants of regulatory enforcement (Weingast and Moran 1983; Weingast 1984; Moe 1985; 
Magat Krupnick and Harrington 1986; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987; Olson 1995, 1996a, 1996b) much 
work remains to be done. Most of these studies analyze a handful of federal (i.e. national) regulatory agencies 
(for instance, the Food and Drug Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency), making it difficult 
to generate broad generalizations, especially to state level regulatory agencies. In addition, because the focus is 
generally on national regulatory agencies, empirical identification of the factors that influence regulatory 
enforcement comes primarily from temporal changes in regulatory regime. Causal identification is hampered by 
the fact that there tend to be relatively few regime shifts over time, and by the possibility that temporal regime 
shifts are correlated with other factors that might also affect the degree of enforcement. 
 
This study furthers our understanding of regulatory enforcement by analyzing the disciplinary behavior of 
medical licensing boards—the state-level organizations that are responsible for licensing physicians and 
policing physician conduct. Across states and over time, medical licensing boards vary in their composition, 
their size, the resources they possess, and the organizational and budgetary autonomy they enjoy from state 
governments. While a body of scholarship has investigated the effects of medical licensing boards on entry into 
the medical profession (Graddy and Nichol 1989; Svorny and Toma 1998), and another has examined the 
specific offenses for which medical boards punish doctors (Clay and Conatser 2003; Morrison and Morrison 
2001; Dehlendorf and Wolfe 1998; and Morrison and Wickersham 1998; Grant and Alfred 2007), no recent 
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work has analyzed how the structure of medical boards affects rates of physician discipline.1 This is a 
significant omission because medical licensing boards, along with the tort system, play an important role in 
policing physician quality. Medical errors are a leading cause of death in America, and the evidence indicates 
that much medical malpractice is never litigated (Baker 2005).2 Our analysis therefore sheds light on an aspect 
of medical regulation that may be increasingly important for health policy.3 
 
We also generate new insights into the issue of regulatory capture. Among regulation scholars, it is widely 
believed that occupational licensing regulation represents the canonical example of capture of the regulatory 
apparatus by the industry being regulated (Stigler 1971; Kleiner 2000). Occupational licensing regulation serves 
as an entry barrier that potentially allows a profession to increase prices and profits, often with little offsetting 
improvement in the quality of professional services. Moreover, the enforcement of licensing laws is almost 
invariably left to the profession itself. Since “insiders” are given the authority to discipline physicians for 
unprofessional conduct, an effect of licensing may be the reduced incentive to punish bad behavior (Derbyshire 
1983). Capture of the regulatory apparatus by the profession may therefore manifest itself in lower rates of 
physician discipline. Since medical licensing boards vary in the degree of independence they enjoy from 
political officials, as well as in the extent of outside (i.e. non-physician) oversight, we test this implication of the 
regulatory capture hypothesis. 
 
Finally, our study represents a methodological improvement over other empirical scholarship of regulatory 
enforcement behavior. We use the variation in medical board structure across space and time to identify the 
factors that influence the extent of regulatory enforcement. Specifically, we match information on the nature of 
medical licensing boards with data on how frequently doctors are disciplined by these boards to estimate the 
importance of board composition, budgetary and organizational independence, and overall resources in 
determining the degree of regulatory enforcement within a fixed-effect framework. The effect of board 
characteristics on the extent of enforcement is therefore identified from within-board variation in characteristics. 
This framework provides more compelling evidence of the causal effect of regulatory regime than existing 
scholarship that relies exclusively on temporal variation at the national level.  
 
We discuss the evolution of state medical boards in Section II. In Section III we outline hypotheses that might 
explain medical board regulatory behavior. This is followed in Section IV by a description of the data that we 
use to estimate the relationship between medical board characteristics and the extent of physician discipline. We 
argue in this section that the distribution of medical board characteristics across states is sufficiently exogenous 
for us to use this variation to identify the effects of board characteristics on physician discipline. We then 
discuss the empirical methodology, our regression results, and some robustness checks in Section V. The 
empirical analysis is followed by a conclusion and a discussion of the broader implications of our findings. 
 
II. Evolution of State Medical Boards 
 
State medical boards were created to protect the public from physician incompetence, but for much of their 
history their primary role was limited to guarding entry into medical profession. Indeed, until the 1980s, 
medical boards seldom disciplined physicians. The American Medical Association (AMA) reported in 1961 that 
“disciplinary action by both medical societies and boards of medical examiners are inadequate,” and that 
physician incompetence as well as ethical and legal violations needed to be examined carefully (quoted in 
Ameringer 1999, p. 2). According to studies by Robert Derbyshire, a former president of the Federation of State 
Medical Boards, state medical boards disciplined about 0.06 percent of all licensed physicians in any year 
during 1963-67; there was only a negligible increase in the number of physicians disciplined between 1968-72; 
and the rate of discipline was still a mere 0.14 percent in 1981 (Ameringer 1999, p. 2). Other studies (Dolan and 
Urban 1983) showed similar ineffectiveness of board activities on physician discipline during this period. 
 
                                                 
1
 Dolan and Urban (1983), to our knowledge, are the only scholars who have analyzed the relationship between 
medical board characteristics and physician discipline. However, the period they study (1960-1977), their 
identification strategy, and their measure of physician discipline differ from ours. 
2
 An earlier Harvard study identified that one percent of all hospital discharges in 51 New York hospitals in 
1984 were due to medical negligence. Fewer than two percent of these victims of negligence filed a malpractice 
claim and only about half them received some compensation (Localio et. al. 1991).  
3
 A related literature examines the political economy of state insurance commissions, which also vary in 
structure and composition across time and space. See Meier (1988, 1991), Klein (1995), and Willenborg (2000). 
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Organized medicine enjoyed its “Golden Age” during this immediate postwar period when physicians enjoyed 
high levels of prestige and influence. However, after lawsuits for medical malpractice became more common in 
1970s, it became increasingly clear that physicians had failed to police and discipline their colleagues through 
inaction and silence (Ameringer 1999, p. 29). Additionally, beginning in the 1980s continuing in the 1990s, 
there were major changes in the organization and structure of health care that fundamentally altered the role of 
state medical boards. These changes included crises in the availability and affordability of medical malpractice 
insurance;4 the rise of consumer groups’ such as Public Citizen’s Health Research; increasing media criticism of 
medical board performance; major restructuring in the delivery of health care through Health Maintenance 
Organizations (HMOs); and reforms that simplified the collection and dissemination of information on health 
care providers. State medical boards were compelled to evolve in response to these changes in the health care 
environment. They became better funded, obtained greater independence in controlling their resources, more 
capably staffed to investigate physician discipline cases, and began to incorporate non-physician 
members.(Ameringer 1999, p. 73). As a result, according to the Federation of State Medical Boards, rates of 
physician discipline increased eight-fold from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s (Ameringer 1999, p. 42).  
 
In an effort to contain cost increases, managed care organizations emerged as dominant players in health care 
markets. By 1995, more than 80 percent of physicians were affiliated with managed care organizations. An 
important consequence of this change was that physicians became more accountable to the third-party payers of 
medical services under the system’s cost-cutting incentives to limit access to medical care. Medical decisions 
were routinely scrutinized and reviewed by HMOs and insurers. In particular, utilization reviews, in which 
HMOs and insurers evaluated the necessity and appropriateness of medical care, became common practice. 
Concerns about the autonomy of medical decision-making and the reputation of the medical profession 
prompted physicians and state medical boards to challenge the authority of HMOs to review medical decisions. 
In response, managed care organizations argued that utilization reviews were a “business function,” and that 
state insurance departments, not state medical boards, should have authority to investigate coverage decisions 
even though state medical boards were the only agencies with the expertise to investigate the quality of medical 
decisions (Ameringer, 1999, p. 117). In the nationally followed Murphy case, the courts decided in favor of the 
Arizona State Medical Board and ruled that the Arizona medical board had the authority to review HMO 
decisions (Ameringer, 1999, p. 118). Thus, the rise of HMOs led to a new relationship between state medical 
boards, physicians, and state medical societies. The HMOs’ emphasis on cost savings measures and “business 
like” decision-making refocused the attention of state medical boards, physicians and state medical societies on 
professionalism and professional autonomy in medical decision making (Ameringer 1999). Accordingly, the 
quality of medical decisions and the reputation of the medical profession emerged as paramount concerns of 
state medical boards.   
 
III. Hypotheses about regulatory enforcement 
 
Broadly speaking, the nature and extent of regulatory enforcement will depend on the incentives that regulators 
face, and the resources they possess. Other things equal, the degree of enforcement will be increasing in the 
resources regulators have at their disposal. Regulatory agencies with larger budgets or more personnel can 
enforce laws more rigorously than those that are more constrained. This prediction is shared by all theories of 
regulatory behavior. 
 
Theories of regulatory behavior differ, however, along other dimensions. At a general level, we can divide these 
theories into principal-agent (PA) theories and bureaucratic-autonomy (BA) theories. PA-theories posit an 
agency relationship between politicians (i.e. legislators), who want policies that cater to the median voter in 
their districts (because politicians are re-election seekers), and regulators, who are utility maximizers (Weingast 
and Moran 1983; McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1989). In this framework, politicians recognize that regulators 
have different objectives than they do, and that they cannot perfectly monitor regulators. Thus, politicians have 
an incentive to design an optimal contract with regulators that aligns the objectives of the regulator with their 
own. There are several mechanisms through which politicians can induce regulators to behave according to their 
wishes. One is through control over agency budgets. The threat of budget cuts in response to “bad” behavior by 
the regulator and the potential for budgetary increases in response to “good” behavior may induce regulators to 
comply with politicians’ desires. Another is through political or public oversight of the regulatory agency. If 
                                                 
4
 There have actually been two “crises” in medical malpractice insurance premiums, one in the early 1970s, and 
another in the late 1980s (Feldstein 2003). Malpractice insurance premiums have continued to increase since 
these crises; however, as a percentage of total health care expenditures, they have remained roughly constant. 
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politicians or members of the public (who share politicians’ preferences) can directly oversee the actions of the 
regulator, regulators are more likely to behave in ways that politicians prefer. In the context of medical licensing 
boards, greater political control over medical board budgets, and measures that increase political oversight of 
medical board behavior (such as reducing the organizational independence of the board from state government, 
as well as altering medical board composition to include more outside members) should increase the extent to 
which boards enforce standards and impose discipline on the medical profession. 
 
BA-theories, on the other hand, highlight the important role that independence from political meddling has on 
the effectiveness of regulatory enforcement (Miller 2000; Carpenter 2001). Scholars in this vein argue that 
regulatory enforcement is likely to be more effective if regulators are granted greater independence from 
political influence. There are several reasons why independence may facilitate regulatory enforcement. First, 
effective enforcement of regulation may not always be in every politician’s best interest. While some politicians 
may benefit from more strict enforcement of regulation, others may benefit from less strict enforcement. For 
instance, in the context of disciplinary actions taken by medical boards, politicians whose re-election campaigns 
receive significant contributions from organized medicine may desire weaker regulatory enforcement of medical 
practice legislation. Measures that insulate regulators from political influence therefore serve as devices that 
commit politicians not to intervene in the regulator process (Miller 2000). Second, regulatory officials, 
particularly in the context of medical regulation, are often reputation maximizing “professionals” (Carpenter 
2001, 2004; Law 2005; Tonon 2008). As professionals, they may be bound by a code of ethics and a selection 
mechanism that puts “doing the right thing” above other objectives. Enforcing regulation effectively may 
enhance their prestige and allow them to expand their budgets and authority. Freedom from political influence 
may, in turn, permit them the autonomy to enforce regulation more effectively. With respect to medical 
licensing boards, BA-theories posit that greater independence (organizational and budgetary) from political 
influence, as well as less political or public oversight of medical licensing boards should result in more effective 
enforcement. As discussed earlier, this concern for professional autonomy and the reputation of the medical 
profession may have become especially important as a result of the rise of managed care and increased public 
scrutiny of the medical profession. Thus, BA-theories and PA-theories generate different predictions regarding 
the relationship between organizational and budgetary autonomy and regulatory effectiveness. 
 
III. Data 
 
The data on physician discipline and medical board characteristics come from two sources: the Federation of 
State Medical Board’s (FSMB) annual Board Action Summary, which provides information on the number and 
type of disciplinary actions taken by each medical board as well as data on the number of licensed physicians 
who are regulated by each board in each year from 1991-2003, and the FSMB’s Exchange (Section 2), which 
publishes information on the characteristics of each medical board in selected years (1993, 1996, 1999, 2003).  
 
Variable definitions  
 
Our primary dependent variable is the total number of disciplinary actions per 1,000 licensed physicians taken 
by each medical board in each year. We divide by the licensed physician population because the number of 
physicians regulated by each board varies significantly across boards. Total disciplinary actions equal the sum 
of licenses removed, licenses restricted, and other actions. In order to determine how board characteristics affect 
the nature of physician discipline, we also use licenses removed per 1,000 licensed physicians, licenses 
restricted per 1,000 licensed physicians, and other disciplinary actions per 1,000 licensed physicians as 
dependent variables.5 
 
We construct a variety of variables to control for medical licensing board characteristics that might influence the 
degree and nature of physician discipline. PA and BA theories of regulatory behavior suggest that factors like 
the size of the medical board, the resources available to each board, the insider-outsider composition of each 
medical board, and the organizational and budgetary independence each board enjoys may influence 
disciplinary actions. Accordingly, we collected data on the number of board members per 1,000 licensed 
                                                 
5
 The FSMB define these categories as follows. Loss of license: includes revocation, suspension, surrender, or 
mandatory retirement of license or loss of privileges afforded by that license. Restriction of license: includes 
probation, limitation, or restriction of license, or licensed privileges. Other disciplinary actions: includes 
modification of a physician’s license, or the privileges granted by that license, that results in a penalty or 
reprimand do the physician.  
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physician, the number of full time equivalent (FTE) staff members employed by each board per 1,000 licensed 
doctor, as well as information on whether board revenues are taxed by the state government to control for the 
resources available to each board to oversee the medical profession;6 the share of outside (i.e. non-physician) 
members on each board to control for the degree of outside oversight over board behavior; and a measure of 
medical board independence to proxy for the extent to which the board is organizationally independent of the 
state government. According to the Federation of State Medical Boards, a board is “independent” if it is fully 
empowered to made decisions regarding physician discipline without having to consult with other organs of 
state government. Independent boards exercise all licensing and disciplinary powers. “Semi-independent” 
boards are subject to some oversight by some other state government department (for instance, departments of 
health). “Advisory” boards, in contrast, exercise a purely advisory role to some central agency within state 
government. Finally we constructed a binary variable that indicates whether the board receives funding from the 
state government. This variable measures the budgetary control that legislators may have over the board.7  
 
Because we only have data on board characteristics for four years, our panel consists of four cross-sections 
representing medical board actions and board characteristics in 1993, 1996, 1999 and 2003. Fourteen states have 
separate medical boards to regulate MD physicians and DO (osteopathic) physicians; in the remaining 
jurisdictions, the same medical licensing board regulates both types of physicians. Accordingly, the number of 
medical boards in our sample (65) exceeds the number of states plus the District of Columbia (51). Due to 
missing observations, we do not have a balanced panel.  
 
Evolution of medical board characteristics, 1993-2003 
 
Since our identification strategy exploits within-board variation to estimate the effects of board characteristics 
on rates of physician discipline, we present data on the distribution of board characteristics by year to illustrate 
how these characteristics evolve over the sample period. Table 1 displays data on medical board independence 
from 1993-2003. The columns in the table report the number of medical boards that fall into each category in a 
given year. While the number of purely advisory boards remains the same between 1993 and 2003, there is 
some movement between the independent category and semi-independent category, albeit with no apparent 
trend towards greater or lesser autonomy. Upon closer inspection of the data, we found that no board switched 
from one category to another more than once, and the four advisory boards were the same throughout this 
period. Accordingly, identification of the effects of board independence on physician discipline comes from 
boards that switch between independent and semi-independent status. 
 
Information on the changing distribution of board size per 1,000 licensed physicians and FTE staff per 1,000 
licensed doctors are shown in tables 2 and 3. Our measures of board size and board staff can change either 
because the number of board members or staff changes, or because the number of physicians regulated by the 
board changes. While the distribution of board size per 1,000 doctors appears to be relatively stable between 
1993 and 2003, there is a trend towards more staff per 1,000 doctors: during this period the number of boards 
with fewer than one FTE staff member per 1,000 physicians declined from 14 to 6 while the number of boards 
with more than four FTE staff per 1,000 physicians increased from 8 to 13. The resources available to medical 
boards, in terms of personnel, have therefore expanded.  
 
Table 4 presents information on the budgetary status of medical boards. Two trends are apparent from this table. 
First, there is a dramatic decline in the number of boards that receive state funds. Between 1993 and 2003, the 
number of medical boards that received funding from state governments fell from 19 to 11. Political control 
over medical board budgets therefore seems to have fallen over time. Second, the number of medical boards 
whose revenues are taxed by the state government increased from 13 to 22. These two trends are also correlated. 
As shown in Table 6, the correlation coefficient between the two dummy variables is -0.27, which indicates that 
boards that receive state funds are less likely to be taxed by state governments. We offer two explanations for 
this correlation. The first is that political control over board budgets can be exercised either by subsidizing 
                                                 
6
 The FMBS Exchange does include some data on medical board budgets. Unfortunately, there were too many 
missing observations for us to use this data. 
7
 The FMBS Exchange also reports information on how board members are selected, whether boards were 
bifurcated by role, the length of board members’ terms, how frequently the boards meet, and other 
characteristics. We did not collect data on these characteristics because they did not vary over time. The 
inclusion of board-specific fixed effects controls for the effect of these time invariant board characteristics on 
physician discipline. 
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board expenditures or by imposing taxes on board revenues. The negative correlation between these two 
variables may be due to the fact that they are substitute mechanisms for exercising political control over 
regulators. A second, and, in our view, more likely explanation is that the decline in the number of boards 
receiving state funding and the increase in the number of boards that are taxed are driven by state-level fiscal 
needs. In response to growing fiscal imbalances, state governments respond by reducing expenditures on 
medical boards (i.e. requiring boards to be self-funded) and by expanding the tax base in search of greater 
revenues (i.e. imposing taxes on medical board revenues). These underlying fiscal trends are presumably 
uncorrelated with factors that influence trends in physician quality.   
 
Table 5 reports information on the distribution of the share of outside (non-physician) membership on medical 
licensing boards. An inspection of this table reveals three important facts. First, no board had a majority of 
outside members.8 Second, for the overwhelming majority of boards, the share of outside membership ranges 
between 10 and 30 percent. Third, the number of boards with no outside members fell from 6 in 1993 to 2 in 
2003. Accordingly, there seems to be a trend toward greater outside participation on medical licensing boards. 
 
Does variation in board characteristics permit causal inferences? 
 
In order to make causal inferences about the relationship between board characteristics and physician discipline, 
we need to establish that board characteristics are exogenous with respect to other factors that might influence 
the quality of physicians and the demand for physician discipline across jurisdictions. While board 
characteristics are clearly not randomly distributed across jurisdictions, our belief is that these characteristics are 
sufficiently exogenous so as to allow us to make causal inferences from this variation. Two pieces of evidence 
support this perspective. First, as shown in Table 6, licensing board characteristics are only weakly correlated 
with each other across jurisdictions. While the size of the board is well correlated with the number of full time 
equivalent staff (correlation coefficient of 0.64), and, as noted earlier, boards that receive state funding are also 
less likely to be taxed by state governments (correlation coefficient of -0.27), none of the other characteristics is 
highly correlated with any of the others, in either a positive or negative direction. If, for instance, board 
characteristics that are associated with greater political control and oversight over board behavior were highly 
correlated with each other, we might be concerned that some omitted factor might be at play that would also be 
correlated with rates of physician discipline. The fact that few of these characteristics have any significant 
correlation with each other provides some evidence in favor of the view that the distribution of characteristics is 
exogenous, at least with respect to underlying preferences for physician discipline. 
 
Second, we did not find any systematic relationships among factors that might be correlated with changes in 
physician discipline within a given jurisdiction and medical board characteristics. In order to rule out reverse-
causality, we analyzed whether lagged changes in rates of physician discipline give rise to changes in medical 
board structure. In these models, we also included other variables to proxy for changes in health care 
environment as well as other changes in political sentiment or tastes within a jurisdiction that might influence 
the demand for physician discipline.  These control variables include: changes in the Medicaid managed care 
share in each state, changes in real per capita personal income at the state level, changes in the state 
government’s share of state GDP, changes in the Democratic vote share in the nearest Presidential election, and 
an indicator variable that equals 1 if the governor of the state is a Democrat and 0 otherwise. Ordinary least 
squares regression estimates of the effects of these variables on each licensing board characteristic are displayed 
in Table 7. While there is some evidence that states that experience faster per capita income growth have a 
smaller share of outsiders on the board, none of the other variables has a statistically significant relationship 
with any of the board characteristics. Board characteristics do not respond to past changes in state-level 
Medicaid managed cares shares, to past changes in rates of physician discipline, nor to changes in our various 
measures of political sentiment or state-level tastes that might also be correlated with increased stringency of 
regulatory enforcement.9 Accordingly, we are quite confident that our empirical analysis of the effects of board 
characteristics on physician discipline will yield valid causal inferences. 
                                                 
8
 If medical board disciplinary decisions are made under a simple majority rule, then our data set would have 
insufficient variation along this dimension for us to assess whether outside membership influences the extent of 
physician discipline. While we do not have specific information on the decision rules used by medical boards to 
make decisions, our understanding is that near unanimity is usually required, which implies that outsiders may 
have real influence on board decisions, even if they are a minority.   
9
 We also included state-level information on the growth rates of medical malpractice premiums between 1991 
and 2001 in an unreported analysis, and found no significant correlations between premium growth rates and 
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IV. Empirical analysis 
  
Our baseline regression for estimating the effect of medical board characteristics on the extent of physician 
discipline is as follows: 
 yist = α + Ristβ + Xstγ + Tt + Bi + εist 
where yist is the number of disciplinary actions per 1,000 doctors taken by board i in state s in year t; Rist is a 
vector of the characteristics of board i located in state s in year t; Xst is a vector of time varying state-level 
control variables; Tt and Bi are year and board fixed-effects, respectively; and εist is an error term. Since this 
regression framework includes fixed-effects at the board and year level, identification of the effects of medical 
board characteristics on rates of physician discipline come from within-board changes in board characteristics 
over time. In other words, we estimate the effect of a given board characteristic on rates of physician discipline 
by comparing changes in rates of discipline across boards that experience a change in that characteristic with 
boards that do not experience changes in that characteristic. The coefficient estimates represented by the vector 
β are therefore estimates of the effects of board characteristics on rates of physician discipline. The inclusion of 
board and year fixed-effects allow us to control for time-invariant, jurisdiction-specific factors that might affect 
rates of physician discipline, as well as nation-wide factors that influence rates of physician discipline. 
 
We estimate this regression equation by ordinary least squares using four different dependent variables: total 
disciplinary actions per 1,000 doctors, number of licenses removed per 1,000 doctors, number of licenses 
restricted per 1,000 doctors, and other actions per 1,000 doctors. The board characteristics (Rist) that we control 
for measure: (i) the resources available to the board to enforce physician discipline (number of board members 
per 1,000 licensed physician, the number of full time equivalent staff members employed by each board per 
1,000 licensed doctors, and an indicator variable that equals 1 if the board’s revenues are taxed by the state 
government and 0 otherwise); (ii) the organizational and budgetary autonomy enjoyed by the board (an indicator 
that equals 1 if the board is classified as independent and 0 otherwise;10 and another indicator variable that 
equals 1 if the board receives state government funding and 0 otherwise); and (iii) the degree of outside 
oversight of the board (share of board members who are not physicians).  
 
Both the PA and BA hypotheses indicate that greater board resources should increase rates of physician 
discipline, but these two hypotheses have different predictions regarding the effects of budgetary and 
organizational autonomy, and the degree of outside oversight on the extent of physician discipline. While the 
PA hypothesis argues that boards that enjoy less budgetary and organizational autonomy and that are subject to 
greater oversight should regulate the medical profession more strictly, the BA hypothesis argues the opposite. 
Finally, Xst includes a number of variables that capture state-specific, time varying factors that may influence 
the extent of physician discipline within each state (board reporting requirements and the Medicaid managed 
care share in each state, real per capita personal income, state government spending as a share of state GDP, a 
Democratic governor indicator variable, and the share of the popular vote that was Democratic in the nearest 
presidential election). We included Medicaid managed care share as a proxy for the growth of managed care at 
the state level in order to control for the possible influence of changes in the health care environment on board 
characteristics.11 Data on the managed care share are taken from Currie and Fahr (2005). The board reporting 
requirements variable—a simple index that equals the number of organizations that must report violations to 
                                                                                                                                                       
changes in medical board structure during this time. While the growth of medical malpractice premiums may 
have contributed to rising rates of physician discipline by medical boards (as has been suggested by the 
literature we surveyed earlier on the evolution of medical boards), they do not appear to have had an effect on 
board structure per se, at least during the period under analysis. Failure to control directly for medical 
malpractice premiums therefore should not bias our estimates of the effects of board structure on physician 
discipline, although it may reduce the fit of our model if concerns about medical malpractice induced medical 
boards, in general, to discipline doctors more carefully.  
10
 Because identification of the effect of board independence comes entirely from switches between semi-
independent and independent boards, we use a binary variable to measure the effect of organizational autonomy. 
11
 The Medicaid managed care share is admittedly an imperfect proxy for the overall penetration of managed 
care at the state level. Unfortunately, we were unable to locate state-level data on overall managed care 
penetration rates for the earliest years of our sample. 
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medical boards—controls for 1990s reforms to make boards more accountable to the public.12 The remaining 
variables control for state-level factors that might influence the level of regulatory stringency. Descriptive 
statistics for key regression variables are shown in Table 8. 
 
For each of the four dependent variables, we estimate four regression models. The first is simply a pooled OLS 
regression that omits the year and board fixed effects. The second includes year effects but not board effects. 
The third includes board fixed effects but no year fixed effects. The fourth (the regression equation displayed 
above) includes both year and board effects. The last model is our preferred specification as it allows us to make 
more compelling casual inferences by controlling for unobserved heterogeneity across boards and over time. 
Nevertheless, it is informative to compare these estimates with those obtained using less structured 
specifications. First, the inclusion of year and board fixed effects consumes degrees of freedom. It is possible 
that the statistical significance of some variables may therefore disappear when fixed effects are included, not 
because they are unimportant, but rather, because there are not enough observations to identify an effect. This is 
a particular concern since the number of years included in our panel is small. Second, by comparing results 
obtained with and without fixed effects, we can see whether the failure to control for unobserved heterogeneity 
significantly biases our findings.  
 
Regression results  
 
Table 9 presents the regression results obtained when total disciplinary actions per 1,000 physicians is the 
dependent variable. In Tables 9 through 12 each column represents a separate regression. Column (1) shows the 
pooled regression results. The regression displayed in column (2) includes year fixed effect while the results 
shown in column (3) include only board fixed effects. Column (4) shows the estimates obtained when year and 
board fixed effects are included. In each regression, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between medical board organizational independence and total disciplinary actions. As shown in column (4), the 
number of disciplinary actions per 1,000 doctors increases by 1.66 when medical boards become 
organizationally independent. This is an economically significant magnitude, representing an increase of 23.5 
percent above the sample mean. The regressions also suggest that board resources influence the extent to which 
medical boards discipline doctors. The number of board members per 1,000 doctors and/or the number of full 
time equivalent staff members per 1,000 doctors has a positive and significant impact on total disciplinary 
actions per 1,000 doctors. Both of these effects are also economically significant. According to the estimates 
shown in column (4), a one unit increase in the number of board members per 1000 doctors increases the total 
number of disciplinary actions per 1000 doctors by 1.14 (14 percent above the sample mean) while a one unit 
increase in the number of full time equivalent staff per 1,000 doctors raises the total number of disciplinary 
actions per 1,000 doctors by 0.28 (4 percent above the sample mean). The coefficient estimates for these 
variables reported in column (4) are also larger in both size and significance. Finally, none of the other board 
characteristic controls has a statistically significant effect on total disciplinary actions, regardless of whether 
fixed effects are included. The lack of statistical significance found for most of our board characteristics 
covariates is therefore not attributable to a reduction in degrees of freedom brought about by the inclusion of 
board and year fixed effects. We also do not find a statistically significant effect of the Medicaid managed care 
share on disciplinary actions.13 Reporting requirements are marginally significant in regressions (1) and (2), but 
this effect disappears when board fixed effects are included. 
 
Tables 10, 11 and 12 display comparable regression results obtained using licenses removed per 1,000 doctors, 
licenses restricted per 1,000 doctors, and other disciplinary actions per 1,000 doctors (respectively) as dependent 
variables. Glancing across the tables reveals the following pattern of results. First, at least one measure of board 
resources (either the number of board members per 1,000 doctors or the number of full time equivalent staff 
members per 1,000 doctors) generally has a positive and statistically significant effect on physician discipline. 
Larger and more statistically significant positive effects of board resources are found when both year and board 
                                                 
12
 The Federation of State Medical Board categorizes these organizations into sixteen different groups. The 
value of this index therefore ranges from 0 to 16. These data are taken from the semi-annual FSMB Exchange. 
13
 The statistical insignificance of the managed care variable does not necessarily suggest, contrary to that the 
growth of managed care did not contribute to rising rates of physician discipline in general. Rather, it suggests 
that cross-state variation in the growth of managed care did not contributed to differences in physician discipline 
across jurisdictions. Additionally, it is possible that managed care reforms and other changes in the health care 
environment (rising malpractice premiums and increased scrutiny of the medical profession) may have already 
induced medical boards to discipline doctors more carefully by the time our data set begins. 
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fixed effects are included. Second, organizational autonomy has a significant impact on some but not all 
measures of physician discipline. Board organizational autonomy is positive and statistically significant when 
licenses restricted per 1,000 doctors is the dependent variable, but is not significant when the remaining two 
measures of physician discipline are used. Third, other board characteristics do not generally have a significant 
effect on any measure of physician discipline. Boards that receive funds from the state government do not 
discipline physicians more or less frequently than boards that enjoy greater budgetary autonomy. Additionally, 
boards that are taxed by state government do not discipline doctors differently than those that are not taxed. The 
degree of outside influence within the board also does not generally have a statistically significant relationship 
with different measures of physician discipline. In none of the year and board fixed effect regressions displayed 
in Tables 9-12 is the coefficient on the share of outside members on the board statistically significant. This 
result is at odds with Dolan and Urban (1983), who, using data from 1960-1977, find that greater non-physician 
participation on medical boards increases the frequency with which physicians are disciplined.14 Accordingly, it 
would appear that outside oversight and greater political control over medical board budgets are not associated 
with more frequent rates of physician discipline. 
 
Taken as a whole, our regression results suggest the following broad conclusions. First, overall resources are a 
key determinant of the extent to which medical boards discipline doctors. Regardless of which measure of 
physician discipline used, larger medical boards and boards with more staff discipline doctors more frequently. 
This finding is consistent with both theories of regulatory enforcement behavior, which predict that the degree 
of enforcement should be increasing in the resources commanded by regulators.  
 
Second, our results provide stronger support for bureaucratic autonomy theories of regulatory behavior than for 
principal agent theories. There is some evidence that more independent boards discipline doctors more 
frequently, at least for some measures of physician discipline. On the other hand, boards that are subject to 
greater outside participation, or greater political control over their budgets, do not discipline doctors more 
frequently. The failure to find evidence in favor of the principal agent view may reflect the fact that during the 
1990s, changes in the health care environment (i.e. the rise of HMOs and increased public scrutiny of health 
care providers) compelled all medical boards to become more accountable to the public. In this setting, greater 
political control or political oversight may not have resulted in stricter physician discipline because physician 
regulators already had a strong incentive to police physician conduct. 
 
Third, our results may shed some light on the issue of regulatory capture. Among regulation scholars, it is often 
argued that medical licensing boards, because they are generally physician-dominated, can be captured by the 
medical profession and operated in ways that increase physicians’ welfare at the expense of the public. Capture 
of the medical board by the medical profession may manifest itself as reluctance on the part of physician-
dominated boards to discipline doctors. One testable implication of the capture theory is that boards that are 
more physician-dominated should discipline doctors less frequently. Another is that boards that are more 
organizationally and financially independent should discipline doctors less frequently. The coefficient estimates 
displayed in Tables 9 through 12 do not support these hypotheses. Our preferred estimates suggest that the share 
of outside membership on the board has no statistically significant effect on the degree of physician discipline, 
regardless of which measure of physician discipline we use. Additionally, boards that receive state funds do not 
discipline physicians more frequently. Indeed, greater organizational autonomy, as noted earlier, is associated 
with higher, not lower, rates of physician discipline. Again, this result is consistent with our previous discussion 
of how fundamental changes in health care markets altered the role of state medical boards. While our managed 
care variable does not have a statistically significant effect on rates of physician discipline, the qualitative 
evidence indicates that concerns about professional autonomy, physician competence, and the reputation of the 
                                                 
14
 There are several reasons why Dolan and Urban’s findings are different from ours. First, their analysis 
focuses on a much earlier time period. Dolan and Urban use data from organized medicine’s “golden age,” a 
period when physicians and medical boards were under little public scrutiny. In contrast, our data are from a 
later period, when changes in the health care environment had forced medical boards and the medical profession 
to become more accountable. Second, Dolan and Urban use a different dependent variable to measure physician 
discipline. Third, they use a different and somewhat arbitrarily constructed measure of non-physician 
participation on medical boards. Finally, because they do not use fixed-effects, their identification strategy is 
different. In regressions presented in first two columns of Table 12, we find positive and statistically significant 
effect of greater non-physician participation on the extent of physicians received other disciplinary actions when 
board fixed effects are not included. Accordingly, part of the difference may be attributable to a failure to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity at the board level. 
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medical profession became important to medical boards during the 1990s. The evidence accumulated suggests 
that these implications of the capture theory may not be well supported during this period, largely because 
changes in the health care environment forced medical boards to become more accountable in general.15  
 
Robustness checks  
 
We undertook a number of robustness checks to investigate the sensitivity of our findings. First, we re-estimated 
the board and year fixed-effect regressions including board specific trend terms. While the inclusion of board 
fixed effects controls for unobserved heterogeneity that is constant within a board, it does not account for 
unobserved heterogeneity that may be changing within a board over time. Accordingly, it is possible that the 
significant effects that we observe in our regressions are being driven by time-varying, unobserved 
heterogeneity within medical boards. One reasonably agnostic way to control for this possibility is to include 
board-specific trend terms. As shown in Table 13, a similar pattern of results is found when board-specific 
trends are included. Board organizational independence has a positive and significant effect on three of four 
measures of physician discipline, as does board size, while the remaining board characteristic variables are 
statistically insignificant. Accordingly, it would appear that our results are robust to the inclusion of board-
specific trend terms. 
 
Second, we re-estimated the regressions using a lagged value of each measure of physician discipline as the 
dependent variable. If the earlier regressions correctly identify the effect of current board characteristics on 
contemporaneous rates of physician discipline, current board characteristics should not affect past rates of 
physician discipline. Estimating the regressions using past rates of physician discipline as the dependent 
variable allow us to rule out the possibility that there is some trend that is driving both board characteristics and 
physician discipline. In none of these regressions are the coefficients on the board characteristics variables 
statistically significant, which help establish that we have correctly identified the effect of board characteristics 
on rates of physician discipline. 
 
Third, we incorporated non-linearity in the effects of board size and/or board staff by including squared terms 
for each of these variables. We included these terms to allow for economies of scale in enforcement. 
Qualitatively similar results were found when these additional variables were included. 
 
Fourth, we re-estimated the regressions incorporating a first order serially correlated error structure (AR(1)) in a 
Prais-Winsten regression framework. The signs and statistical significance levels of the independent variables 
are robust to the inclusion of AR(1) error terms. Accordingly, our findings are not driven by the failure to 
account for serial correlation. 
 
Fifth, we estimated the regressions using negative binomial regression techniques. In this framework, the 
dependent variable is the number of disciplinary actions of a given type (rather than the number of disciplinary 
actions per 1,000 physicians) and we control directly for total physician population as a regressor. The signs and 
significance levels of the right-hand-side variable were similar in these regressions. Total disciplinary actions 
and the number of licenses removed are positively related to board organizational independence. Additionally, 
all forms of physician discipline are increasing in board size and/or board staff. Accordingly, our findings are 
robust to this alternative estimation strategy. In addition, we re-estimated each of our regressions using natural 
logarithmic transformations of the dependent variables and found qualitatively similar results. 
 
Finally, we restricted the sample by eliminating all licensing boards that only regulate DO physicians. DO 
licensing boards, because they regulate a smaller number of physicians, may behave differently than other 
licensing boards. Including DO licensing boards in the sample may therefore introduce measurement error that 
biases our results. Again, we obtained qualitatively similar results when these boards were excluded from the 
sample. Based on all these robustness check results, we are confident that our results correctly identify the 
effects of board structure on physician discipline. 
 
 
                                                 
15
 Capture may still manifest itself, however, in excessively strict control over entry into the medical profession. 
This is evidenced, for instance, by the continued reluctance of the medical profession to recognize foreign 
credentials. Additionally, it is possible that capture resulted in low rates of physician discipline in earlier 
decades, when organized medicine was under far less public scrutiny. 
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V. Conclusion and Discussion 
 
In this study we take advantage of variation in the characteristics of medical boards across the United States to 
determine the effects of board characteristics on rates of physician discipline. This analysis allows us to shed 
some light on the empirical determinants of regulatory behavior and provides a test of different hypotheses 
about how regulators behavior in response to different constraints and incentives.  
 
Our basic findings are threefold. First, the overall resources available to the regulator are a key factor 
determining the degree of physician discipline imposed by licensing boards. Larger medical licensing boards 
and boards with more staff support discipline doctors more frequently. Second, organizational autonomy from 
political influence also affects physician discipline. Licensing boards that are organizationally independent from 
state government discipline physicians more frequently. This finding is supportive of bureaucratic autonomy 
theories of regulatory behavior, which argue that freedom from political influence plays an important role in 
helping regulators enforce regulation more effectively. Finally, other factors such as how boards are funded and 
board composition do not affect rates of physician discipline. Taken together, these findings provide partial 
support for the bureaucratic autonomy approach to understanding regulatory behavior. 
 
Our results are broadly consistent with the view that changes in health care markets during the 1980s and 1990s 
have refocused the objectives of medical boards, physicians, and state medical societies. From the 1950s 
through late 1970s, when the medical profession enjoyed its “golden age” of power and prestige, there was little 
incentive for medical boards to discipline physician conduct. Accordingly, rates of physician discipline were 
low, and boards were primarily concerned with limiting entry into the medical profession and curtailing 
competition from other health care providers (e.g. chiropractors). However, as a result of the rise of managed 
care, increased public scrutiny and skepticism of the medical profession, the growth of medical malpractice 
suits, and other fundamental changes in the health care environment, medical boards and physician groups 
became more concerned with protecting the reputation of the medical profession and the quality of medical 
decisions. Accordingly, the medical establishment found it in its own self-interest to monitor doctors more 
carefully. Rates of physician discipline by medical boards therefore rose dramatically, especially among more 
independent boards and boards with greater resources to police physician conduct. From a public policy 
perspective, these findings suggest that reforms that increase the degree of political or public oversight of 
medical board decisions may not result in stricter regulatory enforcement of physician conduct. In an 
environment where the quality of medical decisions is under intense scrutiny from patients, insurers, and other 
health care providers, self-regulating professions like medicine already have a strong incentive to police their 
own members.   
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Table 1. Medical board independence, 1993-2003. 
 
 1993 1996 1999 2003 
Number of 
“independent” boards 
 
45 48 44 46 
Number of “semi-
independent” boards 
 
14 13 17 15 
Number of “advisory” 
boards 
 
4 4 4 4 
Total number of boards 63 65 65 65 
 
Source: See text. 
 
 
Table 2: Board size per 1,000 licensed physicians, 1993-2003 
 
 1993 1996 1999 2003 
Number of boards for which 
size < 0.5 
 
5 6 6 8 
Number of boards for which 
0.5 < size < 1 
 
11 10 9 8 
Number of boards for which 
1 < size < 1.5 
 
9 7 12 9 
Number of boards for which 
1.5 < size < 2 
 
7 9 7 7 
Number of boards for which 
2 < size < 4 
 
12 10 11 11 
Number of boards for which 
4 < size < 6 
 
7 7 5 6 
Number of boards for which 
size > 6 
 
11 14 14 12 
Total number of boards 62 63 64 61 
 
Source: See text. Calculations by authors. 
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Table 3. Full time equivalent (FTE) staff per 1,000 licensed physicians, 1993-2003. 
 
 1993 1996 1999 2003 
Number of boards for which 
FTE < 1 
 
14 6 11 6 
Number of boards for which 
1 < FTE < 2 
 
12 20 12 11 
Number of boards for which 
2 < FTE < 3 
 
18 15 15 13 
Number of boards for which 
3 < FTE < 4  
 
7 6 11 9 
Number of boards for which 
FTE > 4 
 
8 12 12 13 
Total number of boards 59 59 61 52 
 
Source: See text. Calculations by authors. 
 
 
Table 4. Budgetary status of medical boards, 1993-2003 
 
  1993 1996 1999 2003 
Budgetary 
autonomy? 
     
 Boards that receive 
state funds (Yes = 1) 
 
19 15 12 11 
 Boards that are self-
funded (No = 0) 
 
46 50 53 54 
 Total 65 65 65 65 
State gov’t taxes 
board revenues? 
     
 Boards that are taxed 
by state gov’t (Yes = 1) 
 
13 18 24 22 
 Boards that are not 
taxed (No = 0) 
 
52 47 41 43 
 Total 65 65 65 65 
 
Source: See text. 
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Table 5. Share of outside membership on medical licensing boards, 1993-2003. 
 
 1993 1996 1999 2003 
Number of boards for 
which share = 0. 
 
6 4 3 2 
Number of boards for 
which 0 < share ≤ 0.1 
 
3 5 4 3 
Number of boards for 
which 0.1 < share ≤ 0.2 
 
26 21 21 21 
Number of boards for 
which 0.2 < share ≤ 0.3 
 
20 23 24 21 
Number of boards for 
which 0.3 < share ≤ 0.4 
 
7 11 11 14 
Number of boards for 
which 0.4 < share ≤ 0.5 
 
1 1 2 4 
Number of boards for 
which share > 0.5 
 
0 0 0 0 
Total number of boards 63 65 65 65 
 
Source: See text. Calculations by authors. 
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Table 6. Correlations among board characteristics 
 
  
Board 
independence 
 
Board 
members 
per 1,000 
doctors 
 
 
Full time 
equivalent 
staff per 
1,000 
doctors 
 
Share of 
outside 
members 
on board 
 
Board 
receives 
state gov’t 
funding 
 
Board is 
taxed by 
state 
gov’t 
Board 
independence 
 
1.0      
Board 
members per 
1,000 doctors 
 
-0.11 1.0     
Full time 
equivalent 
staff per 
1,000 doctors 
 
-0.09 0.64 1.0    
Share of 
outside 
members on 
board 
 
0.01 0.17 -0.11 1.0   
Board 
receives state 
gov’t funding 
 
-0.18 -0.01 0.11 0.03 1.0  
Board is 
taxed by state 
gov’t 
 
0.05 0.05 0.00 0.08 -0.27 1.0 
 
Source: See text. Calculations by authors. 
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Table 7. Correlates of board characteristics 
 
 (1) 
Board 
independence 
(2) 
Board 
members 
per 
1,000 
doctors 
 
(3) 
Full time 
equivalent 
staff per 
1,000 
doctors 
(4) 
Share of 
outside 
members 
on board 
(5) 
Board 
receives 
state gov’t 
funding 
(6) 
Board is 
taxed by 
state gov’t 
∆(Total 
disciplinary 
actions per 
1,000 
doctors) 
 
-0.028 
(0.04) 
-3.10 
(2.39) 
-2.94 
(2.29) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
∆(Real per 
capita 
income) 
 
0.47 
(1.44) 
-6.47 
(35.78) 
9.75 
(33.28) 
-0.73** 
(0.34) 
-0.30 
(1.51) 
1.38 
(1.82) 
∆(State gov’t 
spending 
share of state 
GDP) 
 
-0.90 
(0.59) 
17.26 
(17.24) 
13.10 
(19.19) 
-0.19 
(0.24) 
-0.07 
(0.64) 
3.16 
(0.95) 
∆(Managed 
care share) 
 
-0.001 
(0.08) 
2.07 
(2.67) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
-0.13 
(0.12) 
∆(Democratic 
vote share) 
 
-0.27 
(0.18) 
3.12 
(5.87) 
-4.57 
(6.62) 
-0.03 
(0.06) 
 
-0.13 
(0.23) 
0.42 
(0.29) 
Democratic 
governor 
indicator 
 
-0.03 
(0.05) 
-2.74 
(1.90) 
-2.11 
(1.61) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
0.09 
(0.05) 
N 239 236 229 239 239 239 
 
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. State-board and year fixed effects are 
included. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * denotes statistical significance 
at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 8. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable  Mean 
(standard deviation) 
N 
Total disciplinary actions 
per 1,000 doctors 
 
7.05 
(5.90) 
248 
Licenses removed per 1,000 
doctors 
 
2.85 
(2.58) 
248 
Licenses restricted per 
1,000 doctors 
 
2.24 
(2.63) 
248 
Other disciplinary actions 
per 1,000 doctors 
 
1.95 
(2.39) 
248 
Board independence 
(independent = 1) 
 
0.70 
(0.46) 
258 
Board members per 1,000 
doctors 
 
5.83 
(14.53) 
250 
Full time equivalent staff 
per 1,000 doctors 
 
4.59 
(13.16) 
231 
Share of outside members 
on board 
 
0.22 
(0.11) 
258 
Board receives funding 
from state gov’t 
(yes = 1, no = 0) 
 
0.22 
(0.42) 
260 
Board is taxed by state 
gov’t 
(yes = 1, no = 0) 
 
0.30 
(0.46) 
260 
Managed care share 
 
0.46 
(0.31) 
 
260 
Board reporting 
requirements 
(index from 0 to 16) 
 
7.48 
(3.99) 
252 
 
Sources: See text. 
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Table 9. Effects of medical board characteristics on total disciplinary actions per 1,000 
physicians 
 
 (1) 
Pooled OLS 
 
(2) 
Year FE only 
(3) 
Board FE only 
(4) 
Year and Board 
FE 
Board 
independence 
 
1.86*** 
(0.71) 
1.71** 
(0.71) 
2.00* 
(1.06) 
1.66* 
(0.90) 
Board members 
per 1,000 
doctors 
 
0.24* 
(0.14) 
0.24 
(0.15) 
1.10** 
(0.40) 
1.14*** 
(0.36) 
FTE per 1,000 
doctors 
 
0.11** 
(0.05) 
0.11** 
(0.05) 
0.26 
(0.18) 
0.28* 
(0.16) 
Share of 
outside 
members on 
board 
 
0.48 
(3.06) 
3.01 
(3.51) 
5.45 
(5.78) 
4.96 
(5.56) 
Board received 
gov’t funding 
 
-0.13 
(0.76) 
-0.03 
(0.78) 
-0.48 
(1.33) 
-0.06 
(1.40) 
Board is taxed 
by state 
government 
 
1.16 
(0.89) 
1.17 
(0.89) 
-1.98 
(1.38) 
-2.13 
(1.56) 
Reporting 
requirements 
 
0.22* 
(0.13) 
0.21* 
(0.13) 
0.01 
(0.17) 
-0.04 
(0.19) 
Managed care 
share 
 
1.32 
(1.43) 
0.85 
(1.64) 
0.94 
(1.51) 
-1.16 
(1.77) 
Year FE No Yes No Yes 
Board FE No No Yes Yes 
N 229 229 229 229 
 
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Other state-level covariates include real personal income per capita, state 
government spending as a share of state GDP, Democratic governor indicator variable, and 
the Democratic vote share in the nearest presidential election. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 10. Effects of medical board characteristics on number of licenses removed per 1,000 
physicians 
 
 (1) 
Pooled OLS 
 
(2) 
Year FE only 
(3) 
Board FE only 
(4) 
Year and Board 
FE 
Board 
independence 
 
0.60* 
(0.34) 
0.40 
(0.36) 
0.67 
(0.52) 
0.52 
(0.54) 
Board members 
per 1,000 
doctors 
 
0.12* 
(0.07) 
0.11 
(0.07) 
0.30** 
(0.12) 
0.33*** 
(0.12) 
FTE per 1,000 
doctors 
 
0.05* 
(0.03) 
0.05* 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.06) 
0.05 
(0.06) 
Share of 
outside 
members on 
board 
 
-0.43 
(1.34) 
-0.06 
(1.38) 
1.48 
(2.53) 
1.27 
(2.26) 
Board received 
gov’t funding 
 
0.11 
(0.42) 
0.25 
(0.43) 
-0.76 
(0.68) 
-0.51 
(0.72) 
Board is taxed 
by state 
government 
 
-0.27 
(0.37) 
-0.31 
(0.37) 
-0.97 
(0.69) 
-1.05 
(0.78) 
Reporting 
requirements 
 
0.08 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.07) 
-0.001 
(0.76) 
Managed care 
share 
 
0.53 
(0.64) 
-0.14 
(0.68) 
0.51 
(0.69) 
-0.66 
(0.77) 
Year FE No Yes No Yes 
Board FE No No Yes Yes 
N 229 229 229 229 
 
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Other state-level covariates include real personal income per capita, state 
government spending as a share of state GDP, Democratic governor indicator variable, and 
the Democratic vote share in the nearest presidential election. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 11. Effects of medical board characteristics on the number of licenses restricted per 
1,000 physicians 
 
 (1) 
Pooled OLS 
 
(2) 
Year FE only 
(3) 
Board FE only 
(4) 
Year and Board 
FE 
Board 
independence 
 
0.82*** 
(0.28) 
0.95*** 
(0.29) 
0.93** 
(0.37) 
0.81** 
(0.37) 
Board members 
per 1,000 
doctors 
 
0.10 
(0.07) 
0.10 
(0.07) 
0.37** 
(0.18) 
0.38** 
(0.17) 
FTE per 1,000 
doctors 
 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.07 
(0.08) 
0.09 
(0.07) 
Share of 
outside 
members on 
board 
 
-0.83 
(1.34) 
-1.09 
(1.36) 
1.08 
(1.94) 
0.96 
(1.96) 
Board received 
gov’t funding 
 
-0.26 
(0.34) 
-0.33 
(0.34) 
-0.38 
(0.52) 
-0.27 
(0.54) 
Board is taxed 
by state 
government 
 
0.62 
(0.42) 
0.67 
(0.42) 
-0.84 
(0.61) 
-0.94 
(0.69) 
Reporting 
requirements 
 
0.07 
(0.06) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
0.08 
(0.07) 
0.05 
(0.07) 
Managed care 
share 
 
0.79 
(0.61) 
1.17* 
(0.07) 
0.37 
(0.65) 
-0.29 
(0.74) 
Year FE No Yes No Yes 
Board FE No No Yes Yes 
N 229 229 229 229 
 
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Other state-level covariates include real personal income per capita, state 
government spending as a share of state GDP, Democratic governor indicator variable, and 
the Democratic vote share in the nearest presidential election. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
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Table 12. Effects of medical board characteristics on other disciplinary actions per 1,000 
physicians 
 
 (1) 
Pooled OLS 
 
(2) 
Year FE only 
(3) 
Board FE only 
(4) 
Year and Board 
FE 
Board 
independence 
 
0.43 
(0.32) 
0.34 
(0.32) 
0.40 
(0.46) 
0.32 
(0.46) 
Board members 
per 1,000 
doctors 
 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.43** 
(0.21) 
0.43** 
(0.22) 
FTE per 1,000 
doctors 
 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.14* 
(0.08) 
0.15* 
(0.08) 
Share of 
outside 
members on 
board 
 
1.72 
(1.14) 
1.87 
(1.22) 
2.89 
(2.54) 
2.74 
(2.59) 
Board received 
gov’t funding 
 
0.01 
(0.36) 
0.05 
(0.37) 
0.65 
(0.48) 
0.72 
(0.52) 
Board is taxed 
by state 
government 
 
-0.81** 
(0.40) 
-0.81** 
(0.40) 
-0.20 
(0.34) 
-0.16 
(0.34) 
Reporting 
requirements 
 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
-0.09 
(0.07) 
-0.09 
(0.07) 
Managed care 
share  
 
-0.02 
(0.68) 
-0.21 
(0.91) 
-0.05 
(0.52) 
-0.24 
(0.79) 
Year FE No Yes No Yes 
Board FE No No Yes Yes 
N 229 229 229 229 
 
 
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Other state-level covariates include real personal income per capita, state 
government spending as a share of state GDP, Democratic governor indicator variable, and 
the Democratic vote share in the nearest presidential election. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
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Table 13. Including board specific trend terms 
 
 (1) 
Total 
disciplinary 
actions per 
1,000 doctors 
(2) 
Licenses 
removed per 
1,000 doctors 
(3) 
Licenses 
restricted per 
1,000 doctors 
(4) 
Other 
disciplinary 
actions per 
1,000 doctors 
 
Board 
independence 
3.65** 
(1.67) 
1.41* 
(0.75) 
1.21* 
(0.64) 
1.02* 
(0.58) 
Board members 
per 1,000 
doctors 
1.64** 
(0.82) 
0.66** 
(0.33) 
0.56* 
(0.32) 
0.41 
(0.37) 
Full time 
equivalent staff 
per 1,000 
doctors 
2.28 
(1.67) 
0.75 
(0.55) 
0.86 
(0.67) 
0.67 
(0.52) 
Share of 
outside 
members on 
board 
6.89 
(9.21) 
0.38 
(4.19) 
1.02 
(2.80) 
5.53 
(4.40) 
Board receives 
state gov’t 
funding 
2.02* 
(1.11) 
1.01 
(0.72) 
0.29 
(0.48) 
0.70 
(0.66) 
Board is taxed 
by state 
government 
-0.73 
(1.12) 
-0.12 
(0.53) 
0.02 
(0.44) 
-0.67* 
(0.37) 
 
Reporting 
requirements 
0.31 
(0.31) 
0.19 
(0.12) 
0.15 
(0.13) 
-0.03 
(0.12) 
Managed care 
share 
0.45 
(1.83) 
-0.23 
(0.79) 
-0.05 
(0.75) 
0.27 
(0.93) 
Year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Board fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Board-specific 
trend 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 229 229 229 229 
 
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Other state-level covariates include real personal income per capita, state 
government spending as a share of state GDP, Democratic governor indicator variable, and 
the Democratic vote share in the nearest presidential election. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
 
  
